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The Vote and Impound Procedure: Not Always a
Guardian of Employee Free Choice
INTRODUCTION

In 1975 the Chairman's Task Force' on the National Labor Relations
Board 2 was established to evaluate and make recommendations regarding
the Board's case handling practices and procedures.3 A major concern of
the Task Force was the problem of delay in representation elections. 4 One
of the primary causes of delay was the Board's practice of postponing an
election pending review of a pre-election ruling of a regional director.s To
prevent delay the Task Force recommended holding the election at its scheduled date, concluding that pending issues should be resolved after the election
has been held. The Task Force stated that the ballots cast in the election
should be impounded and later counted, after the Board has resolved the
6
issues.
In 1977 a unanimous Board adopted this recommendation, 7 and the impoundment procedure is now contained in section 102.67(b) of the Board's
Rules and Regulations.' The relevant portion of 102.67(b) states that when
a review of a regional director's decision is made, the request:

1. The Chairman's Task Force on the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter Task
Force] was comprised of legal scholars and union and management representatives. The Task
Force disbanded in 1977. General Knit of Cal., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 633 (1978).
2. The National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter Board] is an administrative agency
created by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1986).
3. GeneralKnit, 239 N.L.R.B. at 633-34.
4. Interim Report and Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on the N.L.R.B.
for 1976 6-7 (1976) (unpublished report) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
5. Id. at 11. Each of the Board's regional offices is headed by a regional director. One
of the primary functions of a regional office is to conduct representational campaigns. J.
FEERICK, H. BAER & J. ARFA N.L.R.B. REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS-LAW PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 2.2.4 (1979). Once an election petition is filed, a regional director will determine
whether a question of representation exists, what the appropriate bargaining unit is, and other
election issues. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(a) (1986).
When the parties agree on the principal issues of the election, two types of consent agreements
are reached. In an agreement for a consent election, all rulings and determinations made by
the regional director are final; while in a stipulation for consent agreement, the ruling and

determinations are subject to review by the Board. J.

FEEUCK,

H.

BAER

& J.

ARA,

supra, at

7.2.6. When no consent agreement can be reached, a hearing will be held before a Board
hearing officer. Id. at 7.3. The hearing officer's rulings on election issues are also subject
to review by the Board. Id. Thus, in both a stipulation for consent agreement and when no
consent agreement can be reached, both sides can seek Board review of a regional director's
pre-election rulings.
6. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 12.
7. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIoNs YEARBOOK 325 (BNA) (1977).
8. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (1986).
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shall not, unless otherwise ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of
the election or any other action taken or directed by the regional director:
Provided, however, That if a pending request for review has not been
ruled upon or has been granted ballots whose validity might be affected
by the final Board decision shall be segregated in an appropriate manner,
and all ballots shall be impounded and remain unopened pending such
decision.9

The Task Force observed that the most troublesome problem of this vote
and impound procedurd would occur when a party requests a review of the
regional director's bargaining unit determ ination.' 0
Two recent court of appeals cases, Hamilton Test Systems, Inc. v. NLRB"
and NLRB v. Lorimar Productions,Inc., 2 have concluded that the vote and
impound procedure should not be used when the Board on review has the

potential to determine after the election, that the appropriate bargaining unit
should be significantly smaller than the one Which voted in the election. 3
Under present use of the vote and impound procedure, the Board after the

election simply counts the impounded votes froia thoge employees contained6
5
in the smaller unit. 14 The courts of appeals in Hamilton and Lorimar
proposed that a multiple-ballot election should be utilized when the Board

on review can significantly reduce the size of the bargaining unit after the
election.
Two groups of ballots are prepared in a multiple ballot election. The first
group of ballots is prepared for the employees in the original unit, as
determined by the regional director. The second group is prepared for the

9. Id. The impoundment procedure is hereinafter referred to as the vote and impound
procedure.
10. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 12. A bargaining unit is a group of employees
who may properly be grouped for the purposes of voting in an NLRB election and for collective
bargaining. It is the Board's duty to determine if the unit described in the election petition is
appropriate for voting in the representation election and engaging in collective bargaining. It
is well settled that the Board only has to certify an appropriate bargaining unit. The Board is
not required to find the most appropriate unit. J. FaEEaCK, H. BAaR & J. ARFA, supra note

5, at 8.
Despite this broad discretion given the board, the composition of the bargaining unit is one
of the most hotly contested issues in the representation election process. Id. Employers and
unions often contend that the appropriate bargaining unit as determined by the regional director
is not an appropriate unit at all. The basic guideline for determining whether a bargaining unit
is appropriate is whether the employees share a community of interests, See infra notes 86-91
and accompanying text for a discussion of the community of interests doctrine. The argumnent
is often made that the original unit contains some employees who do not share a community
of interests with the others. See generally infra notes 92-104, and accompanying text.
11. 743 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1984).
12. 771 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1985).
13. See infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of Lorimar
and Hamilton.

14. See infra text accompanying notes 27-30, 34-36.
15. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 141.

16. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1301-02.
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employees in the smaller unit which is requested on review by one of the
parties, Consequently, the employees in the smaller unit will vote twice
because they are in both units. When the Board determines on review which
unit is appropriate, the relevant group of ballots is opened and counted.
This Note will argue that the multiple-ballot election proposed in Lorimar
and Hamilton is appropriate and justified. The use of the multiple-ballot
procedure, when the size of the bargaining unit may be significantly reduced17
on review, is supported by the ideal of employee "free choice," Board
precedent, and the Task Force's report. This Note will propose guidelines
for implementing the multiple-bllot procedure that will not result in the
delay which the vote and impound procedure was intended to prevent, ahd
which will instire that the eiployees are informed of a potential reduction
in the size of the bargaining unit.

I.

FAcTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Problem of Delay

The concern with delay, which prompted the adoption of the vote and
impound procedure, is well founded.' 8 Delay was a critical issue to the Task
Force because the parties in an election prepare their campaigns in light of
the election date and postponing an election produces a great deal of frustration. 9 The Task Force believed that the vote and impound procedure
would prevent delay and enable elections to be held when interest and
momentum are at their peak.20
The postponement of an election also has a potential adverse impact on
a union's chances of victory.2 ' Many employers believe delay is a very
effective tactic in preventing union victory, as stalling intentionally is "a
widely accepted part of industrial relations folklore."' ' A major statistical

17. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of why a multiple-ballot
election cannot be used if the bargaining unit size has the potential to increase after the election.
In this situation, the Board refuses to validate the election and always orders that a second
election be held. Id.
18. The Task Force stated that, "[olne of the principal criticisms of the election process is
the delay that frequently occurs in the holding of the election." Task Force Report, supra note
4, at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Chiaravalli & Lardaro, The Impact of Representation Case Hearings on Certification
Election Outcomes, 7 INDus. REL. L.J. 232 (1985). The authors found that "[d]elay slows or
halts the momentum of unions in certification elections, decreasing the probability of union
victory." Id. at 241.
22. Roomkin & Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of RepresentationElections:
Some EmpiricalEvidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv.75, 76-77.
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study reveals that a delay as short as ten days can have a significant impact
23
on the outcome of an election.
Avoiding delay is a valid concern, and the Board adoption of the vote
and impound procedure reflects this concern. Yet the goal of preventing
delay does not preclude a multiple-ballot election in special circumstances
because the multiple-ballot procedure will not delay an election. 24 Furthermore, the use of thevote and impound procedure when the bargaining unit
can be significantly reduced on review conflicts with a basic tenet of labor
law-employee "free choice." Both the Hamilton and Lorimar decisions
found that the use of the vote and impound procedure interferes with
employee free choice when the size of the bargaining unit is substantially
reduced after the election.

B.

The Facts of Hamilton and Lorimar

An examination of the facts in Hamilton2l and Lorima 26 provides a useful
overview of how the vote and impound procedure can interfere with employee
free choice. In Hamilton, the regional director determined that the appropriate bargaining unit was a plant-wide unit of five groups of employees,
fifteen field service representatives, ten technicians, two customer service
representatives, three crib attendants and one truck driver. 27 The Board
granted the union's request for review and a single-ballot election was held
and the ballots were impounded. 28 Five months after the election the Board
agreed with the union's contention that the appropriate unit consisted only
of technicians, crib attendants and the truck driver. The Board found that
29
this unit had a distinct community of interests from the rest of the unit.

23. Id. at 88. The study analyzed 45,115 elections conducted between July 1972 and September 1978. Forty-six percent of these elections resulted in union victories, which took approximately 1.9 months between the petition for election and the election. Employer victories
took roughly 2.2 months between petition and election. The authors concluded that the ten
day gap between union and employer victories "is significantly related to the outcome of
representational elections." Id.
The authors also found that 80% of all elections took place within two months after the
election petition was filed and more than 90% occurred within three months. Thus, in more
than 90% of all elections the ten-day period is equivalent to at least a 10% increase in the time
between petition and election. The authors concluded that "[i]f this ten-day period is placed
not in the context of the relatively time consuming adjudicatory process applicable to a decision
in an unfair labor practice case, but in the context of the relatively short representation election
process, ten days is a significant period of time." Id.
24. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of how a multiple-ballot
procedure can be used without delaying an election.
25. Hamilton Test Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1984).
26. NLRB v. Lorimar Prods., Inc., 771 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1985).
27. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 138.
28. The Board also rejected the employer's request for review. The employer had contended
that the only appropriate unit was all four of its facilities in the state of New York. Id.
29. Id. at 139. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the community of interests doctrine.
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This reduced the size of the unit approximately fifty-five percent, from
thirty-one employees to fourteen. The ballots cast by the smaller unit were
opened and the union won the election.30
Despite the Board's contention that the voting procedure was mandated
by the Task Force Report and section 102.67(b), the court ordered a second
election. 3' The court concluded that the employees were denied the right to
make an "informed choice" because they were not informed that the size
of the bargaining unit could be dramatically altered after the election. 32 The
court stated that a multiple-ballot procedure where the Board could have
informed the voters of the two possible bargaining units and had the employees in the smaller unit cast two ballots, one for each unit, would have
insured that the employees made an informed choice.33
In Lorimar, a case which the Ninth Circuit found "factually
indistinguishable ' 3 4 from Hamilton, the Board on review reduced the unit
size after the election approximately thirty-five percent, from seventeen to
eleven employees. 3 The Board agreed with the employer's contention that
six production coordinators were confidential employees and excluded their
votes from the unit tally after they had voted. 36 Both the Board 37 and the

30. Id. at 138-39. A comparison between the voting procedure in Hamilton and the procedure
in a multiple-ballot election helps illustrate the important difference between the two. In
Hamilton, all of the employees in the original unit voted. After the election, the ballots of the
employees in the smaller unit whom the union contended comprised the appropriate unit were
segregated from the ballots of the other employees and all the ballots were impounded. When
the Board issued its decision on review, the ballots from the employees in the smaller unit were
counted, while the ballots of the other employees were not considered.
In a multiple-ballot election, both the original unit and the smaller unit contended for one
review vote. The critical difference between the two procedures stems from the fact that the
employees in the smaller unit will vote twice because they are included in both units. This
allows the employees to express what effect, if any, the potential reduction of the bargaining
unit size will have. The two groups of ballots are segregated from each other and impounded,
pending Board review. When the Board issues its decision on review, the appropriate group of
ballots will be opened and counted.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 142.
33. Id. at 141.
34. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1301.
35. Id. at 1297.
36. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes a confidential employee, see J. FEECK, H.
BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 5, at
9.3.2.(1).
37. Brief for Petitioner at 26. Lorimar, 771 F.2d 1294 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
Given the Board's concern with delay, it made the curious argument in Lorimar that if the
employer had an objection to the election it should have requested a stay of the election.
Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1300. Since the Board took six months to issue its decision on review,
a stay would have resulted in a six-month delay. Yet the purpose of the vote and impound
procedure is to prevent delay. If the Board had granted a stay, it would have resulted in the
delay which the vote and impound procedure was designed to prevent. Assuming, arguendo,
that the Board determined the production coordinators were not confidential employees, then
a stay would have resulted in a lengthy delay over an issue which the Board would have later
decided had no merit. This scenario would be a perfect example where the vote and impound
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dissent in Lorimara" argued that avoiding delay was critical and that the vote
and impound procedure accomplished the goal of preventing delay. The

majority in Lorimar recognized the importance of avoiding delay, but noted
"it is at least of equal importance that employees be afforded the opportunity

to cast informed votes on the unit. certified." 3 9 The court proposed that the
multiple-ballot election suggested in Hamilton could prevent delay and insure
that employees cast informed votes.40
II.

A.

FREE CHOICE

Free Choice Defined

Boti the Hamilto 41 and Lorimar42 decisions criticized the use of the vote
and impound procedure because it mislead employees about the size of the

bargaining unit and denied them an opportunity to make an informed choice.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that employees

must be guaranteed a free choice so that they can make informed decisions
in representation elections. As the Court stated in NLRB v. A.J. Tower
Co., "Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion

in establishing the procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and
'43
free choice of bargaining representatives by employees.
The key element in defining free choice is the concept that employees must

be provided with all the necessary information regarding an election. 44 For
employees to make a reasoned choice in an election, they must have access
to relevant information.45 Insuring free choice requires that employees "be

free from restrictions which unduly obstruct the flow of relevant information.... "46 "Public policy under the National Labor Relations Act has
sought to provide individuals with an opportunity to secretly express their

procedure works very well. The problem with the procedure occurs when the unit does change
significantly on review and the employees are not given a chance to take this possibility into
consideration when voting.
38. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1301-04 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1302. Accord NLRB v. Parsons School of Design, 793 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir.
1986).
40. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1302. Accord Parsons, 793 F.2d at 508.
41. Hamilton Test Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
42. NLRB v. Lorimar Prods. Inc., 771 F.2d 1294, 1300 (9th Cir. 1985).
43. 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946). See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767
(1969); Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Ideal Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 330 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1964).
44. A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 114-15 (10th
ed. 1986).
45. Id. at 115.
46. Id.
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true sentiment- once provided the necessary information on which to base
a judgment." 7
The policy reasons for the establishment of the Excelsior List" illustrate
the Board's recognition of the importance of employees receiving relevant
information to insure free choice. In Avon Products, Inc., the Board stated
that the Excelsior List was established to "enhance the availability of information and arguments to employees so that they might render a more
,,49 Thus, the critical issue of the
informed judgment at the ballot box ....
vote and impound procedure is whether employees are denied free choice if
they do not receive information that the size of the bargaining unit may be
substantially reduced after the election. A close examination of this issue
clearly demonstrates that information regarding the size of the bargaining
unit is a critical element of free choice. 50
B.

Free Choice and the Size of the Bargaining Unit

Information regarding the actual size of the bargaining unit can be a
determining factor in how an employee votes in a representation election.
A larger bargaining unit gives employees greater bargaining power than a
smaller unit.5 ' A dramatic reduction in the size of the bargaining unit could
affect employee perceptions on how much bargaining strength the union will
provide.5 2 The Hamilton court recognized this possibility when it stated that
if the employees in the eventual unit had been aware of the smaller unit,
they would have been more likely to conclude that it would not provide
sufficient strength to justify union representation. 53 One advantage of a
multiple-ballot election is that it allows voters to be informed of a possible
unit chang& and the extent of the change, which could affect perceptions of
bargaining power.
The actual composition of the bargaining unit can also affect the employees' perceptions of-the expected benefits of unionization. The Hamilton
court observed that the Board's original unit contained two distinct groups
in terms of pay and advancement. The court noted that the final unit

-

47. Roomkin & Block, supra note 22, at 92 (emphasis added).
48. The Excelsior list is a rule the Board established in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). The rule states that within seven days after a consent election agreement
is reached, the employer must file with the regional director an eligibility list, containing the
names and addresses of all the eligible voters. This information then becomes available to the
parties involved in the election. Id. at 1239-40.
49. 262 N.L.R.B. 46, 48 (1982).
50. See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
51. J. FEERICK, H. BAR & J. ARaA, supra note 5, at 265.
52. Chiaravalli & Lardaro, supra note 21, at 234. "Changes in the scope and composition
of the appropriate bargaining unit can adversely affect the expected benefits of unionization,
and hence the number of union votes." Id.
53. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 141.
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determination had a tier of employees, the truck driver and crib attendants
who received lower pay and fewer opportunities for advancement than the
technicians.14 The court stated that the technicians might not have wanted
unionization if they were only included with the lower paid crib attendants
and truck driver and separated from the higher paid field service representatives."
The court did not make the argument but it is also plausible to hypothesize
that the technicians also could have believed thaat union representation would
help them gain wages comparable to what the field service representatives
earned. If this were true, they presumably would have wanted the smaller
unit so that their interests would not be subordinate to the interests of the
field service representatives. Either argument has merit and both arguments
illustrate how an employee's choice in an election can be affected by a
change in the bargaining unit. A multiple-ballot election gives employees the
opportunity to voice any effects of a potential change in the bargaining unit.
An employee's free choice may also be influenced by discussions with
other employees about the costs and benefits of unionization. These group
discussions often help shape or reshape an individual's opinion on how to
vote in an election.5 6 Employees not only respond to the economic incentives
of unions, but they are also motivated by the pressures and friendships
within the unit.5 7 A reduction in the size of the bargaining unit can have a
dramatic effect on these "group dynamics." 58 If the Board substantially

54. Id. See supra note 27 and accompanying text for a discussion of who was included in
the original unit.
55. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 141. The Board applied the factors cited by the Hamilton court
in a recent decision. In Parsons School of Design, 275 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 1985 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) § 17216 (April 19, 1983), the Board on review excluded 20 full-time teachers from a
unit of 200 part-time teachers. The Board observed that the Hamilton factors were not present.
Only ten percent of the unit was disqualified, so no significant diminution of bargaining strength
existed, nor was there a grouping of lower and higher paid employees. The Board concluded
that Parsons was distinguishable from Hamilton and did not order a second election. Id. at
6-7.
The Board's decision in Parsonswas reversed by the Second Circuit on the basis of its
reasoning in Hamilton, 793 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1986). For a further discussion of this case, see
infra note 152.
56. Cooke, Determinants of the Outcomes of Union Certification Elections, 36 INDUS. &

REv. 402, 403 (1983). In each unit there will always be some employees who will
not be influenced by the group or the size of the bargaining unit. These individuals will be
either pro-union or anti-union regardless of any discussion or change in the bargaining unit.
Id. at 404. Cooke also states that "It]he size of the work unit is a central issue in any analysis
of the hypothesis that the decision to vote for or against the union is fashioned in part by
collective aspirations." Id.
57. Id. at 404.
58. Id. at 410. Cooke postulates that these "group dynamics" only have an effect on an
election if the unit size is 65 employees or less. Id. However, this figure encompasses a substantial
majority of all elections. In the Roomkin and Block study, 78% of all the elections held between
July, 1972 and September, 1978 had units of 60 employees or less. Roomkin & Block, supra
note 22, at 85-88. In fiscal year 1980, 82.7% of all elections were held in units which were
LABOR. REL.
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changes the bargaining unit after an election, then a significant portion of
the group which may have helped shape and influence the collective aspi-

rations may not be included in the unit.
The Hamilton court also recognized that employee interaction within the

work force can also affect the way they vote. The court noted that the
original unit would have maintained a unified work force because it included
all the employees at the employer's facility. 9 A reduction in the unit might
have led the employees to believe "that the representation by a union in

only part of the facility could produce divisiveness and provoke undesirable
tensions in the work place." 6 The court also stated that perceptions of
leadership within 6the
unit might have been affected by the change in the
1

scope of the unit.
The preceding discussion illustrates why the courts of appeals in Hamilton
and Lorimar concluded that the employees might have voted differently had
they known the true scope of the unit. 62 The dramatic consequences of
employees potentially voting differently if they are informed of a potential

unit change is illustrated by a recent statistical study. 63 The study illustrates
that the number of employees who constitute a margin of victory in a
representation election is extremely small. A switch of six votes would have
altered election outcomes in union victories, while a switch of nine to ten
votes would have changed the result in employer victories. 64 On the basis of
these statistics, the study concluded that the decision of a few employees to

65
switch their votes can change the result of an election.
The final election results in Hamilton and Lorimar illustrate how a small
percentage of vote switches can change the election. In both Hamilton66 and

Lorimar6 7 the final tally was six employees voting for union representation
and four against it. A vote switch by one of the employees voting for union

comprised of less than 60 employees. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 287 (1980). These statistics illustrate
that "group dynamics" will have an effect in a majority of representation elections.
59. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 141.
60. Id.
61. Id.All of the Hamilton court's concerns were noted with approval by the court in
Lorimar. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1301. Accord NLRB v. Parsons School of Design, 793 F.2d
503 (2d Cir. 1986).
62. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 141; Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1302. One former member of the
Board also agreed with the courts' conclusion that employees might vote differently if they are
aware of a potential change in the bargaining unit. In Daily Mining Gazette, then member
Hunter concluded that a reduction in the size of the unit from fifteen to five employees denied
employees "the right to make an informed choice in the selection or rejection of a bargaining
representative." 273 N.L.R.B. 350, 353 (1984) (Hunter, dissenting).
63. Roomkin & Block, supra note 22, at 90.
64. Id. The authors found that the average size of a bargaining unit when an employer
wins an election is 70.4%, the size for union victories is 39.4%. Id.
65. Id.
66. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 138.
67. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1297.
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representation would have changed the result of both elections because a
union must win a majority of the valid votes cast in the election. 68 One can
only hypothesize whether the election results in Hamilton and Lorimarwould
have been different if the employees would have been aware of the potential
unit change. The advantage of the multiple-ballot election is that it informs
the employees of the potential change, which insures that the election result
represents the true desires of the employees.
Information regarding the size of the bargaining unit is clearly a critical
element of employee free choice because this information can affect how
an employee votes in many different ways. Recognition of the important
relationship between free choice and information concerning the bargaining
unit led the court in Lorimar to conclude that the scope of the bargaining
unit is "an issue which is central to the voters' ability to cast an intelligent,
voluntary ballot.''69

Despite the compelling arguments of free choice, the Board downplayed
its significance in Lorimar. The Board contended that the goal of preventing
lengthy delay was more important. "While it may be desirable to afford the
voters the greatest amount of information possible prior to the voting, the
advantages of making more information available must be weighed against
the delay that the use of procedures [a multiple-ballot election]

.

.. proposed

by the company would entail." '70 The Board's argument mischaracterizes the
issue. The goal in an election is not to provide employees with the optimal
amount of information, as the Board suggests, but rather to provide relevant
information to insure free choice. Information regarding the eventual size
of the bargaining unit is a critical element of free choice. The Board's
observation that it was "highly speculative" that the employees might have
voted differently if they were informed of the change in the unit is not
supported by the preceding discussion. 7'
III.

A.

THE BOARD AND FREE CHOICE

The Election Notice Cases

Despite the Board's arguments in Lorimarand Hamilton, it has recognized
in other contexts the importance of employees receiving accurate information

68. J. FEERICK,. H. BAER & J AaRA, supra note 5, at

7.6.10 n.289.

69. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1312. Accord Parsons, 793 F.2d at 1312.
70. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 26-27. Preventing delay is an important concern.
However, it is also important to note that the disagreement between the courts of appeals and
the Board has resulted in lengthy delays. Parsons, 793 F.2d at 508. For example, in Parsons
the election was held in May of 1983 and the Second Circuit finally reversed the Board three
years later, in June of 1986. Id. at 503, 505.
71. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 27. See also Parsons, 793 F.2d at 505, where
the regional director stated that "the unit determination had no bearing as to whether the
voters desired Union representation."
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regarding the eventual size of the bargaining unit. In one group of cases
the Board had to decide whether an employer's failure to post an election
notice 72 immediately upon receipt violates free choice. A majority of the
Board in Kilgore Corp. held that the posting of election notices one day
before an election destroyed the "laboratory conditions for holding a fair
election. ' 73 First enunciated in General Shoe Corp.,7 4 the laboratory conditions test compels the Board to conduct an election under conditions as
nearly as ideal as possible to determine the "uninhibited desires" of the
employees. 75 In General Shoe, the Board stated "an election can serve its
true purpose only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to register
a free and untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative.' '76
In Kilgore, one reason why the Board ruled the laboratory conditions were
destroyed was the Board's recognition that the group dynamics 77 within the
bargaining unit influence how employees vote. The Board stated that the
election notice allows employees to, "discuss the election issues with their
fellow employees and friends so they might come to a reasoned decision by
the date of the election. ' 78 One important issue contained in an election
notice is the "unit description and [the employees] possible eligibility or
ineligibility. ' 79 The Board's recognition of the importance of the unit description illustrates why the employees should be informed that the unit
description may change after the election.8 0 A multiple-ballot election provides this necessary information and insures that employees register a "free
and untrammeled" choice for or against a bargaining representative.
After the Kilgore decision, the individual members of the Board adopted
different and somewhat confusing standards in evaluating whether a late
posting of election notices was sufficient grounds for setting aside an election.8 ' Despite the differing standards, a consistent concern of the Board
1

72. An election notice informs employees of the details of the election and their rights
under the National Labor Relations Act. J. FEERicK, H. BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 5, at
7.6.5.
73. 203 N.L.R.B. 118, 119 (1973).
74. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
75. Id.at 127.
76. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
77. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of "group dynamics"
within a'bargaining unit.
78. Kilgore, 203 N.L.R.B. at 119. See infra text accompanying notes 129-33 for a discussion
of how a multiple-ballot election would give employees an adequate opportunity to discuss its
procedures.
79. Id. See also Congoleum Indus., 227 N.L.R.B. 108 (1976).
80. The election notice does not inform the employees of the potential unit changes. Parsons,
703 F.2d at 506.
81. E.g., ContractorsRedi-Mix, 250 N.L.R.B. 121 (1980); Earle Indus., 246 N.L.R.B. 68;
Kane Industries, 246 N.L.A.B. 738 (1978); (1979); Printhouse, Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 741 (1979).
In Printhouse, then Chairman Fanning criticized the Board for not adopting a single rationale
for deciding the election notice cases.

1138

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1127

was whether employee free choice had been preserved. 2 In Earle Industries,
Inc., 3 one Board member stated that in the absence of standard rule, he
would evaluate the facts of each case to determine whether the employees
had sufficient opportunity to be informed of the details of the election and
to discuss the issues of the election. The Board's reasoning in these cases
illustrates that the Board clearly recognizes the importance of providing
information about the size of the bargaining unit.85
B.

The Community of Interests Doctrine

Support for a multiple-ballot election can also be found in the factors
used by the Board for determining the appropriate bargaining unit. The
Board's goal when defining a unit "is to group together only those employees
who have substantial mutual interests in wages, hours and other conditions
of employment." ' 86 Commonly referred to as the community of interests
doctrine, these mutual interests are the controlling factors in how the Board
determines an appropriate bargaining unit. 7 If the Board defines a unit
where the employees do not have a community of interests, it can lead to
unrest, instability and confusion in the collective bargaining process.88 The
Ninth Circuit observed in Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB that if employees in a unit do not have a community of interests, both employee's
rights and industrial peace are threatened. 9 In Crown Zellerbach Corp., the
Board stated it would not allow the employees of one plant to be submerged
into a multi-plant bargaining unit, when those employees possessed a distinct
community of interests from those employees in the other plant. 9
The preceding paragraph illustrates the importance of the community of
interests doctrine and the universal recognition that a bargaining unit which
contains employees Who do not have the same community of interests will
create serious problems. Board approval of the vote and impound procedure
when the unit size is reduced because of differing community of interests is

82. E.g., Earle Indus., 248 N.L.R.B. at 68; Kane Indus., 246 N.L.R.B. at 738; Printhouse
Co., 246 N.L.R.B. at 742.
83. Earle Indus., 248 N.L.R.B. at 67 (Truesdale, concurring).
84. Id. at 68.
85. In Lorimar, Parsons and Hamilton, the Board ignored the reasoning behind its decisions
in the election notice cases. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
86. J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J. ARFA, supra note 5,
8.2 (quoting 15 NLRB ANN. REP.
39 (1950)).
87. Id. The community of interests doctrine is discussed more fully at
8.2.1-8.2.12.
88. J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE N.L.R.B. AND TnE APPROPRIATE BAGAINING UNrr (rev. ed. 1981). See also Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a
Balance Between Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 479,
482 (1967).
89. 587 F.2d 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 1978).
90. 246 N.L.R.B. 1407 (1979).
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not consistent with the community of interests doctrine. In Hamilton over
half of the employees in the original unit were excluded from the unit because
they did not share a community of interests with the other employees. 9' The
Board excluded these employees because it recognized that their inclusion
would have lead to unrest and instability in the collective bargaining process.
Yet the employees who comprised the final unit voted under the impression
that the unit included those employees who were later excluded. The vote
and impound procedure does not inform the voters when the potential exists
that a group of employees will be excluded from the unit because of differing
community of interests.
An examination of Board cases highlights how the vote and impound
procedure can operate inconsistently with the community of interests doctrine. In Associate Milk Producers, Inc., the Regional Director determined
that the appropriate unit was all the truck drivers at three separate employer
locations. 92 The employer sought review of this determination. The employer
argued that the appropriate unit should only consist of its two locations in
Stephenville, Texas and that its Comanche, Texas location should be excluded. The Board granted review and the ballots were impounded.
In its decision on review the Board agreed with employer's contention. 93
This decision reduced the size of the unit approximately thirty-three percent,
from fifty-three employees to thirty-five. 94 The Board based its decision on

its finding that the Stephenville employees had a separate community of
interests from those employees at the Comanche location. The Board determined that the Stephenville drivers had frequent contact with each other
and shared immediate supervisors. In contrast, the drivers in the Comanche
facility had less frequent contact with the Stephenville drivers, a different
seniority system and different supervisors. 9 The owner of the Comanche
facility and the dispatcher who handled the day-to-day supervision were not
even employed by Associated Milk Producers. 96
Despite the fact that thirty-three percent of the employees who voted in
the election had a distinct community of interests from the eventual unit,
the Board ordered that the Stephenville ballots be opened and counted. This
decision is a concrete example of the flaws of the vote and impound procedure. In Associate Milk Producers,the employees voted under the impression that the bargaining unit would consist of employees from the Comanche
facility who were employed under markedly different conditions than those
at the Stephenville facility. Yet the Board, which has consistently recognized
91.
92.
93.
94:

See supra notes 27-29, 53-55 and accompanying text.
251 N.L.R.B. 1407 (1980).
Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1407.

95. Id. at 1408.

96. Id.at 1407.
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the importance of the community of interests doctrine, did not even consider
this fact. Given the fact that the Board will not allow bargaining units to
consist of groups with different community of interests, the Board should
utilize the multiple-ballot procedure to inform employees that the unit size
may change because of differing community of interests.
Textprint, Inc., is another example of the Board significantly reducing the
size of the unit after the election b.ecause the employees did not share a
community of interests. 97 In this case, tWo corporations, TKG and Textprint,
shared the same facility. The regional director determined that a single
bargaining unit was appropriate because the employees of both corporations
possessed similar community of interests.98
The Board granted review to evaluate the union's contention that only
the Textprint employees should be included in the unit. The election was
held and the ballots impounded. On review, the Board agreed with the union
as it determined that the Textprint employees should be a separate bargaining
unit because they had a distinct community of interests from the TKG
employees. On the basis of this decision, the Board ordered that only the
ballots of the Textprint employees be opened and counted.9 9 The Board's
decision reduced the unit size approximately thirty-five percent. 1°0
The Board based its decision on the fact the Textprint employees performed
dissimilar types of work and had different work classifications. TKG employees generally possessed greater skills than the Textprint employees, twentyfive percent of whom were engaged in manual labor. TKG employees were
allowed to go outside the plant at lunch, while that privilege was not given
to Textprint employees.' 0' TKG and Textprint were also run by separate
plant managers and there was no common controlling ownership in both
firms. Consequently, virtually no interchange of supervisory and non-supervisory employees occurred between TKG and Textprint, and if an employee were transferred, retraining was necessary. 02
The application of the community of interests doctrine supports the need
for the multiple-ballot election. The Board reviews a unit determination
carefully if it appears the unit contains employees with different community
of interests. Yet the Board is unwilling to consider the problems that arise
when employees vote under the impression that a substantial number of
employees with whom they do not share a community of interests are included
in the unit. In both Textprint and Associated Milk Producersthe employees
should have been informed of the potential unit change because the com-

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

253 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 1102-03.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1103.
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position and size of a bargaining unit can affect how an employee votes. 03
IV.

THE TASK

FORCE REPORT AND THE

Globe Analogue

The preceding analysis of free choice, Board precedent and the community
of interests doctrine clearly illustrates the desirability of a multiple-ballot
election. An analysis of the Task Force Report demonstrates that the Task
Force also foresaw a need for a multiple-ballot election. The Task Force
recognized that the most troublesome problem of the vote and impound
procedure would occur when the Board agreed to review a unit determination.' ° In response to this concern, the Task Force stated that "the Board
could develop a balloting process under which the election could be held,
whatever the eventual decision might be on the appropriate unit." The Task
Force noted that "an analogue is the Globe election procedure which has
been used successfully since 1937."101 The Globe analogue refers to an
election procedure used
by the Board since its decision in Globe Machine
°
and Stamping Co.'
A Globe election, often called a self-determination election, gives employees an opportunity to voice their opinion as to which type of bargaining
unit they desire. The procedure is most often used when two unions are
vying for the same group of employees-but one union seeks to represent
them separately in a small craft unit, while the other union seeks to include
them with other employees in a more comprehensive unit, usually a plantwide unit. 10 7 A self-determination election is also used when there is only
one union seeking representation rights but the Board concludes that more
than one bargaining unit is equally appropriate. Consequently, in a selfdetermination election the employees determine by a multiple-balIot procedure which union they desire and the unit in which bargaining -will be
conducted. 08

103. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
104. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 10. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text
for examples of when a request for review does not concern the unit determination.
105. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 12-13.
106. 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
107. R. GoRmAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 72 (1976).

108. Id. The mechanics of a self-determination election are somewhat complicated. In a twounion election, the employees in the prospective smaller unit can choose between the smaller
craft unit and the union seeking the more comprehensive plant-wide unit; these employees
generally are not given the option to vote "no-agent." The other employees in the prospective
larger unit can choose between the union seeking to represent the plant-wide unit and "noagent." At the same time the employees vote for a particular union they are also voting whether
they desire the union to be their exclusive bargaining representative.
If the craft union secures a majority of votes in the smaller craft unit, that union will
represent those employees in that separate unit; the votes of the remaining employees will be
tallied as a separate group to determine whether the other union has been selected by a majority
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The interpretation of the relationship between developing an appropriate
balloting process and the Globe analogue was a source of disagreement
between the Board and the courts of appeals in Lorimar and Hamilton. The
Board in Lorimarcited the Globe election procedure to support its contention
that the vote and impound procedure was proper even if the bargaining unit
size could be substantially reduced after the election.' 9 The Board stated
that it has long followed the general procedure prescribed by Section
102.67(b)-conducting an election before making a final determination as
to the scope of the appropriate unit. The Board emphasized that in both a
Globe self-determination election and a single-ballot election using the vote
and impound procedure, the employees do not know what the eventual
bargaining unit will be when they vote." 0
The Board also cited section 9(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
as another example of a self-determination election where the employees at
the time balloting do not know what the ultimate boundaries of the unit
will be."' Section 9(b)(1) of the Act prohibits professional and non-professional employees from being included in the same bargaining unit unless a
majority of the professional employees vote to be included in the unit in
the representation election." 2 In the Board's view, the use of a Globe selfdetermination election legitimizes the use of the vote and impound procedure
in single-ballot elections because in both situations the final unit determination is made after the election.
The Hamilton court also recognized the established use of self-determination elections. However, the court focused on the Task Force's suggestion
to develop an appropriate balloting process, whatever the eventual decision
might be on the appropriate unit."' The court criticized the Board for not
developing a balloting process where two groups of ballots could have been
prepared, one for each possible unit." 4 This process, according to the court,
would have informed the voters of the possible alternatives in the selection
of the bargaining unit and would have permitted them to vote accordingly.'
The court in Lorimar interpreted the Globe analogue as evidence that the
Task Force foresaw the need for a multiple-ballot election. The court reasoned that the reference to the Globe analogue illustrated that the Task

of the remaining employees or whether those employees will go unrepresented. If, on the other
hand, employees in the smaller craft unit do not give the craft union a majority vote, then
the votes of all employees in both the large and small units will be pooled. The union will be
certified if it is selected by a majority of employees in that pooled group. Id.
109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 24.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 25.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1986).
113. Hamilton Test Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1984).
114. Id. at 141.
115. Id.
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Force envisioned the procedure suggested by the Hamilton court." 6 The
court, unlike the Board, construed the Globe analogue to refer to a multipleballot election.
A.

Factual Differences Between a Self-Determination Election and
the Vote and Impound Procedure

The Lorimar court's reasoning is most persuasive because many crucial
differences exist between a self-determination election and an election using
the vote and impound procedure. When the employees vote in a self-determination election, they do not know what the final bargaining unit will be.
However, the employees are aware that more than one possible unit exists.
In Hamilton"7 and Lorimar"8 the Board did not inform the voters that the
bargaining unit size could be drastically reduced after the election." 9 A selfdetermination election also differs from an election using the vote and
impound procedure because in a self-determination election the employees
chose the appropriate unit. They do not know what the eventual unit(s) will
be when they vote, but it is their decision that decides the final unit(s).
When the vote and impound procedure is utilized the employees do not have
any voice in'determining the appropriate bargaining unit. The use of the
vote and impound procedure therefore denies employees two important aspects of a self-determination election-the knowledge that the final unit
determination has not been made and an opportunity to decide the scope
of the bargaining unit.
The self-determination election for professional employees also differs
from the vote and impound procedure. The number of professional employees is usually extremely small in comparison with the number of nonprofessionals. Whether the professionals are or are not included in the unit
will not substantially affect the eventual size of the unit. 20 Even if it is
assumed that the inclusion or exclusion of the professional employees will
affect the votes of non-professionals, the non-professionals at least have the
knowledge that the professionals may or may not be included.
The Board also cited the example of employees who vote subject to
challenge as another example where the employees vote before the eventual
scope of the unit is determined.' 2' The challenge procedure, however, is
116. NLRB v. Lorimar Prods. Inc., 771 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1985).

117. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 138.
118. Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1300.

119. In NLRB v. Parsons School of Design, the Board prepared separate ballot boxes for
the full and part-time teachers. 793 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1986). The Board's representative
did not explain why separate ballots were being used unless the representative was specifically
asked. See also supra note 55.
120. H.R. RaP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1947), reprintedin I NLRB, LaGisLAV=
HISTORY OF Tm LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs ACT OF 1947, at 407, 417 (1948).
121. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 37, at 25.
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different from a review of a unit determination because it is not concerned
with what the appropriate bargaining unit is, but rather with individual voter
eligibility. The parties to the electibn determine who is eligible to vote,
"[o]nce the proper parameters bf an appropriate bargaining unit have been
established.' 2 2 Thus, the challenge procedure involves only individual questions of eligibility withiih the agreed upon bargainiig unit. The court in
Hamilton recognized th'e distinctioni between the two procedures when it
noted that cuestions of votei eligibility frequently involve only a few voters
whose' exclusion or inclusion will not significantly change the scope of the
unit. 23 The Task Force Report also did not equate the challenge procedure
with what it perceived as the most troublesome problem of the vote and
impound procedure-a review of a unit -determination. 24 The Task Force
stated that questions of voter eligibility "could be dealt with by the usual
method of challenging ballots.' ' 25 The Board's argument that'the use of the
vote and impound procedure is sanctioned by the use of self-determination
elections or the challenge procedure is not persuasive.
B.

The Task Force Language Regarding a Self-Determination
Election

The substantial differences between a self-determination election and the
vote and impound procedure support the Lorimar court's conclusion that
the Globe analogue refers to a multiple-ballot election. An analysis of the
Task Force's language also supports this conclusion. If the Globe analogue
were only cited as evidence that elections are held before the final unit
determination is made, then there would have been no reason for the Task
Force to recommend that the Board "develop a balloting process under
which the election could be held, whatever the eventual decision might be
on the appropriate unit.' 1 26 The vote and impound procedure also allows
for the election to be held whatever the outcome of the appropriate unit
decision. Clearly, the Task Force was citing the Globe analogue as an example
of a multiple-ballot election when it urged the Board to "develop a balloting
process." The Task Force language is therefore further evidence that a
multiple-ballot election should be used in conjunction with the vote and
impound procedure. 2 7 The reference to the Globe analogue illustrates that

122. J. FEERiCK, H. BAER & J.ARFA, supra note 5, at 358.
123. Hamilton, 743 F.2d at 140.
124. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 12.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Although he dissented in Lorimar, Judge Pregerson also interpreted the Globe analogue
to apply to a multiple ballot election. "[T]he Task Force .. . did not require the Board to
implement a Globe-type multiple-ballot election." Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1304 (Pregerson, J.,
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the Task Force foresaw potential problems with a strict use of the vote and
impound procedure in all situations, problems which are evident in the
Lorimar and Hamilton decisions. This Note's proposal for a multiple-ballot

election is consistent with the Task Force's concerns.
V.

A PROPOSAL FOR A MULTIPLE-BALLOT ELhCTION

The preceding analysis presents a convincing argument for the implementation of a multiple-ballot election when the size of the bargaining unit can
be significantly reduced on review. The following proposal for instituting a
multiple-ballot election can eliminate the problems of the vote and impound
procedure without causing the delay which the procedure was designed to
prevent. This proposal also protects free choice because the employees will
have adequate notice to understand the purpose and procedures of a multipleballot election.

A.

The Issue of Notice

The first issue raised by the multiple-ballot proposal is how far in advance
of an election should the employees, the employer and the union be notified
that the procedure will be used? This Note proposes that the parties be
notified at least five working days before the election that a multiple-ballot
election will be utilized. This five day notice period will be sufficient for
both the union and the employer. Neither party will have to follow any
additional procedures, such as filing an election petition'2 or compiling an
Excelsior list. 129 When a request for review of a unit determination is filed
with the Board, the other party must receive a copy of such request. 3 0
Consequently, both parties know well in advance of the five day period that
the multiple-ballot procedure could be used. This allows both parties ample
time to prepare any campaign strategy that may be utilized if a multipleballot election is ordered.'

dissenting). While Judge Pregerson correctly noted that as an advisory committee, the Task
Force did not require the Board to adopt a multiple-ballot procedure, his statement also provides
further evidence that the Task Force did not equate a self-determination election with the vote
and impound procedure. The Board cannot cite the Task Force Report as evidence that the
Task Force mandated or approved of the use of the vote and impound procedure in all situations.
128. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Since the unit can only decrease in size when
a multiple-ballot election is used, no Excelsior list is required because no new employees will
be added. See also infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
130. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(K)(2) (1986).
131. For example, if the employer had requested review, the union could explain to the
employees that the request is just another example of the employer doing anything to confuse
the election issues and hurt the union's chances of victory. The union could emphasize that
no matter what the decision is on the eventual unit, the employees should vote union. If the
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Although the parties should be given notice that the multiple-ballot procedure will be used, insuring employee free choice is the primary goal of a
multiple-ballot election. The five working days notice will guarantee that the
goals of free choice are met. The multiple-ballot procedure does riot raise
any new election issues that have to be addressed by the employer or union
or understood by the employees. Rather, its sole purpose is to inform the
employees that the bargaining unit could change after the election.
Since the election campaign has been in progress for some time, the
employees will have presumably formed their basic opinions about union
representation from the campaign and will have had the opportunity to
discuss their views with other employees. Five days will be sufficient to allow
the employees to determine if the potential unit change will affect those
perceptions and how the employees will vote. One other reason why the five
day period provides sufficient notice stems from the fact that most bargaining
units are comprised of less than sixty employees. 3 2 Thus, the practical
problems of informing the employees about the multiple-ballot election are
minimal. More importantly, the smaller number of employees in most units
will allow employees to assess rather quickly the implications of the potential
unit change and discuss them with other employees.
The Board should also adopt an official statement that will be posted in
areas where it can be read by all employees. The statement must clearly
explain that the purpose of the multiple-ballot election is to insure that the
employees vote with the knowledge that the bargaining unit could change
after the election. A critical factor which must be stressed is that the employees should not make any assumptions about the Board's decision to
grant review. The employees should be advised that the decision to review
the unit determination does not mean the unit will necessarily change on
review. The employees should only be advised that the potential for a change
in unit size does exist.
This statement must clearly address both potential bargaining units. For
those employees only voting in one unit, it should be emphasized that their
vote is not worthless, as the unit they are in could very well be the eventual
unit. For the employees voting in both units, it should be stressed that they
should carefully consider their vote in both units because it is an open
question which unit will be deemed appropriate. The basic voting procedure
of a multiple-ballot election should also be explained. The conclusion of the

union requested review the employer could focus on the employees that the union seeks to
exclude and explain how the union does not want them. Both these tactics could be very
effective. While the purpose of the multiple-ballot election is to insure free choice and not to
provide additional election strategy, to think both sides Would not try such tactics would be
naive. One way to counteract such tactics is a Board statement explaining the procedure. See
infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
132. See supra note 58.
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statement should again emphasize that the purpose of the multiple-ballot
procedure is to provide employees with the important information of a
potential unit change. This statement will also further the goals of preserving
employee free choice.

B.

How Can the Board Meet the Five-Day Deadline?

In order for this proposal to work, the Board must have the capability
to meet the five-day deadline. Thus, the Board must be able to issue its
decision to grant review of a unit determination at least five working days
before the election date. An examination of Board cases illustrates that
simply implementing the proposal for a multiple-ballot election does not
guarantee the Board will be able to meet the five-day deadline. In many
cases the Board has granted review of a unit determination the day before
or the day of the election.' 33 The Board in other cases has granted review
three, 3 4 four, 33 and five'36 working days before the election. Therefore,

while it does not seem impracticable for the Board to meet the deadline,
additional procedures must be instituted to guarantee that the deadline will
be met.
The Board can meet the requirements of the five-day deadline if it adopts

a procedure similar to the procedure authorized by section 10(L) of the
National Labor Relations Act. 3 7 Under section 10(L), whenever a complaint
has been filed that a violation of sections 8(b)(4) or 8(b)(7) of the Act has
occurred, the complaint is given priority over all other complaints, except
those of like character.' 38 The Board should adopt a similar procedure when
a request for review has the potential to substantially reduce the size of the
bargaining unit. All requests of this nature should be given priority to enable

the Board to meet the five-day deadline. One important reason why the
expedited review will be especially applicable to the multiple-ballot procedure

stems from the fact that many requests for review do not involve a potential
reduction in size of the bargaining unit.

133. In Hamilton and Lorimar, the Board did not grant review until the day before the
election. Hamilton Test Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Lorimar
Prod., 771 F.2d 1294, 1300 (1985). See also Eastman Interiors, 273 N.L.R.B. 610 (1984) (Board
granted review the day of the election); Daily Mining Gazette, 273 N.L.R.B. 350 (1984) (Board
granted review the day before the election); Avon Products, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 42 (1982)
(Board granted review the day before the election); United Parcel Service, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B.
223 (1981) (Board granted review the day of the election).
134. Charrette Drafting Supplies Corp., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 177, 1985 N.L.R.B. Dec.(CCH)
§ 19,674 (July 31, 1985).
135. Monroe Auto Equipment, 273 N.L.R.B. 103 (1984).
136. Tio Pepe, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 537 (1978).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1986).
138. Id. Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) prohibit, in some cases, picketing and other forms of
conduct which a union is utilizing for recognitional or organizational purposes. For a more
detailed discussion of these concepts, see R. Gomua.N, supra note 107, at 220-35.

1148

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1127

The Board if often asked to grant review to consider whether the unit is
larger than the one determined by the regional director. 3 9 In this situation
the employer often contends that a multi-plant unit rather than a singleplant unit is appropriate, or that a plant-wide unit is appropriate rather than
a unit comprising only a portion of a unit. 40 If the Board on review finds
4
the larger unit is the appropriate unit, then it always vacates the election.' '
The obvious reason why the Board vacates the election in this situation is
that the employees who were not included in the original smaller unit did
42
not vote in the election.
It would be impractical for the multiple-ballot procedure to be utilized
when the unit contended for on review is larger than the original unit. The
union must file a new election petition and the employer must compile a
new Excelsior list because of the potential addition of new employees into
the unit. 43 More importantly, the employees who would be included in the
larger unit would not be involved in the election campaign until the Board
decided to grant review. Since this would not occur until the end of the
election, they would have been excluded from most of the election campaign.
Another example of when a request for review does not involve a potential
reduction in the size of the bargaining unit occurs when an employer claims
that an election should not be held at all. 44 The Board uses the vote and
impound procedure in this situation despite the possibility that is may decide
that no election should be held. 45 Yet if the Board decides that the election

139. Abdow Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 1269 (1984); CharretteDrafting, 275 N.L.R.B. No. 177;
Genuine Parts Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1984); Continental Trailways, 232 N.L.R.B. 628 (1977).
140. The reason why a union often seeks the smaller unit and the employer the larger is
that conventional wisdom holds that the larger the unit and the more facilities that the bargaining
unit covers, the more difficult it is for the union to win the election. See J. FEasuCK, H. BAER
& J. ARFA, supra note 5, at 265-66; Sebris & McDonald, Bargaining Unit DeterminationCase
Trends of the N.L.R.B., 37 LAB. L.J. 378, 378-79 (1986). See also supra note 64.
141. See Abdow, 271 N.L.R.B. 1269; Charlotte Drafting, 275 N.L.R.B. No. 177; Genuine
Parts,269 N.L.R.B. 1052; ContinentalTrailways, 232 N.L.R.B. 628. It is important to recognize
that if the Board does agree with the regional director's unit determination then the vote and
impound procedure serves its purpose without interfering with free choice.
142. See cases cited supra note 141.
143. See cases cited supra note 141.
144. E.g., Teledyne Economic Dev. Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1981); Management and Training Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 1152 (1982) (in both cases the Board rejected employer arguments
that the Department of Labor, not the employers, was the true employer); Bayshore Transit
Management, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 969 (1980) (the Board on review denied the employer's
contention that it did not have sufficient control over labor relations to engage in collective
bargaining); Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurant, 238 N.L.R.B. 700 (1978) (the Board denied on
review the employer's assertion that a collective bargaining agreement barred the election).
145. The Task Force recognized the problem that a decision on review could result in the
election being a nullity. It concluded, however, that this would only happen in a small minority
of cases. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 13. The cases cited in supra note 144 support
that conclusion.
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should have been held, which it does in many cases, 46 the vote and impound
procedure serves its purpose of not delaying an election.
Board statistics also indicate that the Board does not grant a majority of
the requests for review of pre-election rulings of the regional directors. For
example, in fiscal year 1980 the Board only granted 101 requests for review
out of 687 requests, 47 and in fiscal year 1976 the Board ruled upon 599
requests for review and granted review of only 101 requests. 48 These statistics
illustrate that in a majority of cases the requests for review have very little
merit. If they had some merit, then the Board would presumably grant
review. 149 Consequently, when the Board utilizes the expedited election
procedure it will only have to focus on those few cases which involve a
substantial reduction in the size of the bargaining unit which appear to have
some merit. Determining what constitutes a substantial reduction leads to
the final issue of the multiple-ballot election-what criteria should the Board
consider when deciding whether to grant an expedited review?
A Board decision to grant the expedited review process is critical because
it insures that if the Board does grant review, the multiple-ballot election
procedure can be utilized without delaying the election. An important factor
for the Board to consider is the potential reduction in unit size. The Board
should automatically grant an expedited review when the bargaining unit
size can be reduced at least thirty percent on review. When a union petitions
for an election, it must establish that thirty percent of the employees in the
petitioned for unit support the union named in the petition. 50 An expedited
review should be granted when the bargaining unit can be reduced by the
percentage needed to initiate the election in the first place.
One other potential factor the Board may consider is the size of the initial
unit. Since group dynamics have more of an effect in smaller units, percentage changes of less than thirty percent will have a greater effect in
smaller units.'-' A twenty percent reduction in an original unit of thirty
employees will probably be a better candidate for a multiple-ballot election

146. See cases cited supra note 144.
147. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 245 (1980).
148, 41 NLRB Am. REP. 211 (1976). Unfortunately, Board statistics do not break down

the requests for review on the basis of issues. Consequently, exactly how many of these requests
involve a potential reduction in the bargaining unit size cannot be determined.
149. This especially makes sense in a review of a bargaining unit determination. A request
for review that essentially asks that the Board find a more appropriate unit will be denied,
because the Board only has to find an appropriate unit, not the most appropriate one. See
supra note 10.
150, See J. FEERICK, H. BAR & J. ARFA, supra note 5 at § 6.3.1; see also Hamilton, 743
F.2d at 137-38; Lorimar, 771 F.2d at 1297; Textprint, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1101-02 (1981);
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1407, 1407-08 (1980) (all involving reductions
of 30 percent or more).
151. See supra note 58.
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than a twenty percent reduction in an original unit of
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Other factors

may be germane to a particular request, but certainly the size of the original

unit and the potential percentage reduction of the original unit will be the
most important factors. The implementation of the expedited election pro-

cedure will insure that the multiple-ballot procedure will not delay an election.
CONCLUSION

The previous discussion of the proposal for a multiple-ballot election

illustrates that it is a practical solution to the problems of the vote and
impound procedure. The Board's concern with delay is understandable and

in many cases the vote and impound procedure does prevent unnecessary
delay. However, when the bargaining unit can be reduced on review, present

use of the vote and impound procedure ignores the importance of employee
free choice and the community of interests doctrine. The implementation of

a multiple-ballot election will not delay the election and it will preserve free
choice because the employees are informed of the possibility that the bargaining unit size may change after the election.
VILDA SAMUEL LAURIN III

152. In NLRB v. Parsons School of Design, 793 F.2d 503, 504 (2d Cir. 1986) the Second
Circuit ordered a new election despite the fact that the exclusion of 20 full-time teachers from
the unit of 200 part-time teachers only resulted in a 10% reduction in the unit size. See also
supra note 55. The court stated that the part-time teachers may have intended to rely on the
full-time faculty members to assume most of the responsibility for the union work because the
full-time faculty would have had more of a stake in improving the terms and conditions of
employment. Parsons,793 F.2d at 508. While the court's argument has some merit, a strong
counter-argument exists that the sheer numerical strength of the part-time teachers would dictate
that they would control the union. The best solution to the Parsonscase would be a multipleballot election. However, if the Board is not capable of expediting all reviews regarding unit
reductions, the facts of Parsons would not make it a prime candidate for expedited review.

